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Salience as an emergent property 
In the classical theory of noncooperative games, the formal representation of a game in 
normal or strategic form takes no account of how players and strategies are labelled.  
Arbitrary player labels (such as ‘row player’ and ‘column player’) and strategy labels (such 
as ‘up’ and ‘down’) may be used by the theorist as an aid to analysis, but these are not 
intended to represent how the players describe the game to themselves, and are not treated as 
part of the specification of the game; solution concepts are defined so that they are 
independent of such labels.  However, it is widely recognised that in real-world games, 
players often do take account of the labels that feature in their own descriptions of those 
games, and that these labels can play an important role in equilibrium selection. As first 
hypothesised by Thomas Schelling (1960), players recognise (and expect their co-players to 
recognise) that, by virtue of differences in labelling, some equilibria are more ‘prominent’ or 
‘salient’ than others; there is a systematic tendency for the most salient equilibrium (the 
‘focal point’) to be selected.1  There is now a large body of experimental  evidence which 
confirms this hypothesis in relation to pure coordination games (e.g. Mehta et al., 1994a, 
1994b; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Crawford et al., 2008; Bardsley et al., 2010), and 
some evidence that this result extends to tacit bargaining games that are framed in ways 
suggestive of real-world bargaining (Isoni et al., 2011).  But although there have been a 
number of attempts to incorporate labels into formal game theory (e.g. Lewis, 1969; 
Gauthier, 1975; Sugden, 1995; Bacharach and Stahl, 2000; Casajus, 2001; Janssen, 2001; 
Bacharach, 2006), theorists have had little success in finding general characterisations of the 
features that make some labels more salient than others.  For this reason, the concept of 
salience has never been truly assimilated to game theory, even though most game theorists 
acknowledge the truth of Schelling’s insights.  
 In explaining the concept of salience, Schelling (1960) relies heavily on metaphors.  
He describes players as searching for a ‘clue’, ‘key’, ‘hint’, ‘message’, ‘signal’ or 
‘suggestion’ that is hidden in their decision problem.  He says that a focal point is 
‘prominent’, ‘conspicuous’ or ‘obvious’; it has a ‘claim to attention’, a ‘power of suggestion’  
                                                          
1
 In this paper, we will use the term ‘salient’ to refer only to properties of labels and to similarity relationships 
between labels.  
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or an ‘intrinsic magnetism’; it ‘commands recognition’, ‘suggests itself’, exerts ‘discipline’, 
‘communicates its own inevitability’, or ‘dictates’ that it is to be chosen.2  He emphasises that 
focal points can be found by many different methods, including the use of ‘analogy’, 
‘precedent’, ‘aesthetic or geometric configuration’, ‘casuistic reasoning’, and ‘whimsy’ (p. 
57).  He makes much use of illustrative examples, which are intended to help the reader to 
understand the common features of focal points.  For example, in a coordination problem in 
which the players are trying to give the same answer to ‘Name any positive number’, the 
focal point is ‘1’; to ‘Name a place in New York City to meet the other person’, the focal 
point (for people in New Haven, Connecticut in the 1950s) is ‘Grand Central Station’; to 
‘Name a time of day to meet the other person’, the focal point is ‘12 noon’.  What is salient 
for any specific pair of players may depend on their common experiences and cultural 
repertoires, but the concept of salience is to be understood as a generic feature of games.  
 For Schelling, it seems, finding focal points is more of an art than a science.  The 
skills that are required can be taught and learned, but seem incapable of being reduced to 
mechanistic rules.  Thus, game theorists who have read Strategy of Conflict can recognise 
focal points when they see them, but cannot represent Schelling’s ideas in the formal 
language of their theory. 
 This is not to deny that specific aspects of salience can sometimes be modelled by 
means of relatively minor additions to classical game theory.  For example, the intuitive idea 
that uniqueness confers salience can be represented in theoretical models in which the set of 
possible labels is highly restricted (Casajus, 2001; Janssen, 2001; Bacharach, 2006).  
Similarly, the intuitive idea that frequent public references to an object confer salience can be 
represented in a model in which players observe independent samples of a common pool of 
references (Sugden, 1995).  But if one tries to represent the feature that is common to the 
salience of ‘1’ among the set of positive numbers and to the salience of ‘Grand Central 
Station’ among the set of potential meeting places in New York, game-theoretic modelling 
seems to be of little use.  Nevertheless, there clearly is a common feature, which Schelling is 
able to describe by metaphor and example.  As we have pointed out, the experimental 
evidence shows that individuals do tend to choose salient strategies in coordination games.  
So salience is not just a concept that ordinary people are capable of learning: it is a concept 
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 For page references to Schelling’s many uses of these metaphors, see Sugden and Zamarrón (2006). 
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that they already perceive and use as a means of solving coordination problems.  It is 
therefore natural to ask how common perceptions of salience originate. 
 In this paper, we sketch a possible answer to this question.  We consider the 
mechanisms by which, when the members of a population face recurrent coordination 
problems, conventions of behaviour emerge.  We argue that labelling plays an important role 
in these mechanisms.  In consequence, the conventions that emerge in different areas of 
social life tend to have certain common labelling characteristics.  By becoming aware of 
these characteristics, whether consciously or unconsciously, individuals become more 
proficient in recognising the conventions that other people are following and in anticipating 
the conventions they will find in unfamiliar settings.  We suggest that these common 
characteristics are significant components of the concept that game theorists call ‘salience’.  
On this account, salience is an emergent property of human interaction. 
 In Section 1, we explain the sense in which we are using the concept of ‘emergence’.  
This understanding of emergence is closely related to the idea of spontaneous order, as 
analysed by Friedrich Hayek.  In some significant respects, the same understanding is 
implicit in modern evolutionary game-theoretic analyses of the emergence of conventions in 
recurrent play of coordination games.  However, most evolutionary game theory has taken no 
account of how the emergence of conventions might be influenced by properties of labelling.  
We argue that an adequate theory of experiential learning needs to take account of labelling. 
 In the remainder of the paper, we present a simple model of salience as an emergent 
property of recurrent interaction, and discuss some relevant experimental evidence.  Our 
model is based on two ideas.  The first is that one of the mechanisms by which experiential 
learning works is a tendency for an individual, when facing a new decision problem, to recall 
previous problems that are perceived as similar to it and to choose an action that is perceived 
as similar to actions that, when chosen in those problems, were followed by favourable 
outcomes.  This mechanism, applied in the context of games against nature, has been 
modelled by Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler (1995) as ‘case-based decision theory’.  
The underlying idea is common to many theories of inductive learning; indeed, Gilboa and 
Schmeidler cite David Hume’s (1739–40/ 1987) theory of induction as an inspiration.  The 
second idea is that, in the context of recurrent games, perceptions of similarity can be based 
on labelling, and that some kinds of labelling similarity are more reliably perceived than 
others.  Thus, a putative convention is more likely to emerge and reproduce itself, the more 
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capable it is of being described in terms of reliably-perceived similarities.  The intuition that 
some features of the labelling of strategies are more readily perceived than others, and so are 
more likely to seed conventions, has been expressed before (e.g. Schlicht, 1988; Sugden, 
2004), but we believe that our analysis in terms of similarity relations is new.
3
  
 In Section 2, we offer an intuitive account of how the emergence of conventions may 
be the product of similarity-based learning.  In Section 3, we present a formal model of this 
learning mechanism in a very simple environment, in which pure coordination games of the 
kind studied by Schelling are played recurrently.  Deliberately, we model a version of the 
mechanism that makes minimal demands on individuals’ cognition and memory.  In acting in 
accordance with this mechanism, individuals do not engage in any kind of strategic 
reasoning; they simply attempt to repeat actions that have been successful in the immediate 
past.  We show that, even in a population of such low-rationality agents, there is a tendency 
for salience-based conventions to emerge, ‘salience’ being defined in terms of reliable 
perceptions of similarity.  In Section 4, we discuss evidence from an experimental 
investigation of recurrent play of coordination games.  This evidence suggests that pairs of 
co-players learn to use similarity-based rules which increase the success with which they 
coordinate, and that the process of learning is based on the replication of co-players’ previous 
choices.  
 
1.  Emergent properties and spontaneous order 
The concept of ‘emergence’ can be used in many different ways.  In this paper, we are 
concerned with emergent properties that are characteristic of spontaneous order, broadly in 
the sense in which Hayek (1973: 35–54) uses that expression.  For our purposes, it is most 
useful to think of spontaneous order not as a property of reality, but as a property of theories 
or models that purport to explain or represent reality.  
 A spontaneous order is a pattern that is created when a population of entities interact 
together.  Each member of the population acts on its own ‘laws of motion’, but their 
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 The general hypothesis of reinforcement learning – that is, the tendency to repeat rules or actions that have 
been successful in the past – is frequently used to explain learning in repeated games (e.g. Roth and Erev, 1995).  
There has been some work on how such learning can be transferred between games that, strategically, are 
similar but not identical; this can lead to the emergence of conventions that specify particular solution concepts 
such as payoff dominance (e.g. Rankin et al., 2000).  In contrast, our paper is concerned with similarity relations 
between labels. 
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interactions create coherent patterns at the population level that are not simple aggregates of 
properties that the individual entities possess in isolation.  Patterns that are created by such 
self-organising processes are emergent properties of interaction. 
 Consider an example from natural science – the properties of scree slopes.  Scree 
slopes are made up of countless numbers of loose rocks, lying against the sides of mountains.  
These slopes are strikingly regular, with an even gradient from top to bottom.  This regularity 
can be explained as a result of a simple property of loose rocks.  For a given type of rock, 
there is a critical angle of slope; if an individual rock is placed on a slope steeper than this, it 
will tend to roll down, while if it is placed on a slope less steep than this, it will not move 
unless it is hit by some other body.  Because of erosion, pieces of rock are constantly 
breaking loose from mountain sides and rolling downwards.  If any area of a scree slope is 
temporarily steeper than the critical angle, it is unstable, and rocks tend to roll away from it; 
if any area is less steep than the critical angle, it tends to accumulate rocks which roll down 
from above and then stop.  There is thus a constant tendency for the gradient of the slope to 
adjust itself towards the critical angle.  According to this explanation, the regular gradient of 
scree slopes is a spontaneous order. 
 Notice that a general spatial property of large masses of rocks is being explained 
without any detailed analysis of the motions of individual rocks as they fall from above, 
move downhill and collide with other rocks.  However, there is a presumption that those 
motions are fully explained by the principles of physics; and no additional causal factor is 
invoked in explaining the gradient of the scree slope.  In this sense, the properties of the slope 
supervene on the properties of the rocks.  Crucially, the pattern at the population level is 
created through the interaction of the individual components in a process with feedback 
loops.  In contrast, the mere accumulation of masses of fallen rocks below mountains is not a 
spontaneous order, even though it is a predictable population-level consequence of the laws 
of motion of the individual rocks.  That consequence is a simple aggregation of the tendency 
of individual rocks to fall, while the regular gradient of a scree slope is an emergent property 
of interaction among rocks.     
 As an example of spontaneous order in human interaction, consider Schelling’s (1978: 
137–166) ‘checkerboard’ model of racial segregation.  (Recall that we are treating 
spontaneous order as a property of models, not of reality itself.  Whether or not Schelling’s 
model provides a good explanation of segregation in twentieth-century American cities, there 
6 
 
is a clear sense in which it describes a spontaneous order.)  In this model, individuals are 
divided into two racial groups; each individual prefers not to live in neighbourhoods where 
there is a large majority of the other group.  Individual choices based on these preferences 
interact to induce extreme segregation, even though no one wants this: segregation is an 
emergent property of interaction. 
 Until relatively recently, most game theory did not use spontaneous-order modes of 
explanation.  The Nash equilibrium ‘solutions’ that game theory investigated were assumed 
to be common knowledge among perfectly rational players, either because those solutions 
were supposed to be accessible to rational agents by some unmodelled process of reasoning, 
or because they were ‘suggested’ to players by some unmodelled external authority.  Game 
theorists hoped to narrow down the set of ‘reasonable’ equilibria by abstract analysis (e.g. 
Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).  Considered in this conceptual framework, focal points tended to 
be seen as anomalous.  Perfectly rational players, it was thought, would not need to base their 
decisions on salience – or would not be able to justify doing so. 
 There was a fundamental shift in the methodology of game theory in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when evolutionary analysis began to be widely used.  Evolutionary game 
theory studies games that are played recurrently by individuals drawn from large populations.  
Individuals are not assumed to be perfectly rational, but merely to gravitate towards utility-
maximising choices in dynamic processes of experiential learning.  Equilibrium concepts are 
useful to the extent that they identify stable stationary points in such processes.  Notice that 
stable equilibrium is a population-level property that is generated through a process of 
interaction between individuals, and that (because what is utility-maximising for one 
individual depends on how other individuals behave) feedback plays an essential role in this 
process.  In other words, stable equilibrium in an evolutionary model is a case of spontaneous 
order.  Expressing the same idea the other way round,  Schelling’s checkerboard model was 
evolutionary game theory avant la lettre. 
 Evolutionary game theory offers an explanation of social conventions as emergent 
properties of recurrent interactions between individuals, each of whom is pursuing his own 
interests given his expectations about other individuals’ behaviour, where those expectations 
are grounded in his previous experience (e.g. Skyrms, 1996; Young, 1998; Sugden, 2004).  
Familiar examples of conventions that can be explained in this way include traffic rules, rules 
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for resolving conflicts over valuable resources, and common expectations among traders 
about the medium of exchange. 
 But despite this methodological shift, salience still receives little attention from game 
theorists.
4
  In standard evolutionary game-theoretic models, learning processes are 
represented in models (for example, replicator dynamics or fictitious play) which make no 
reference to how strategies are labelled.  If players’ strategies and payoffs are completely 
symmetrical with one another, conventions are modelled as originating in symmetry-breaking 
perturbations.  The thought seems to be that when games are played recurrently, salience is a 
redundant explanatory concept. 
 But as Robin Cubitt and Sugden have argued, that thought is mistaken (Cubitt and 
Sugden, 2003; Sugden, 2004, 2011).  Standard evolutionary accounts of learning fail to deal 
with the following problem.
5
  Experiential learning requires inductive inferences which 
project perceived regularities in a person’s experience of previous games.  Since no two 
games are exactly alike, those projections must rely on perceptions of similarity between non-
identical games.  Such perceptions are subjective, and so are likely to be sensitive to 
labelling.  In the recurrent real-world interactions that evolutionary game theory is attempting 
to represent, a person’s past observations can typically be fitted to a vast number of different 
logically possible patterns of similarity, with respectively different projections onto new 
games.  Inductive inference works because only a small number of these patterns are 
recognised and perceived as ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’ .  The only regularities that have the 
potential to reproduce themselves as conventions are those that fit pre-existing perceptions of 
obviousness that are shared by members of the relevant population.  If this conclusion is 
correct, shared perceptions of similarity play an essential role in experiential learning.  In 
consequence, one of the patterns to be found in the spontaneous order of conventions may be 
a tendency for conventions to be aligned with shared perceptions of similarity. 
 So far, our discussion has been very abstract.  To help explain our ideas, we now 
consider a concrete example of how the emergence of a convention might be influenced by 
perceptions of similarity. 
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 One exception is Binmore and Samuelson’s (2006) evolutionary analysis of games in which it is costly to 
‘monitor’ labels.  Since this model of the evolution of salience is very different from ours, we do not discuss it 
further. 
5
 This problem seems to have been first noticed by Lewis (1969).  See also Goyal and Janssen (1996). 
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2.  The Right Turn Problem 
At most British road junctions, driving behaviour is governed by priority rules that are 
designated by the highway authorities.  Normally, one road through a junction is assigned 
priority; ‘Give way’ signs and road markings on the other routes signify that vehicles on 
those routes must yield priority to the traffic on the major road.  This system works well at T-
junctions, but has proved to be dangerous at crossroads – so much so that, outside towns, 
crossroads have progressively been replaced by pairs of slightly offset T-junctions.  Where 
crossroads survive, drivers continually confront what we will call the Right Turn Problem.  
Consider a crossroads at which the east-west road has priority.  Suppose this road is clear.  
One vehicle is approaching the junction on the minor road from the north, indicating the 
intention to go straight ahead; another is approaching on the minor road from the south, 
signalling to turn right.  Since Britain drives on the left, their paths will cross.  Which vehicle 
should give way to which?  Failure to resolve this coordination problem can result in two 
stationary vehicles in the middle of the junction – a very dangerous outcome, since major-
road drivers, who do not expect to have to give way to anyone, may be approaching the 
junction at speed. 
 Surprisingly, the Highway Code (the official codification of the rules of the road in 
Britain) provides no guidance on this question.  If one thinks of the minor road as a 
continuous route across the junction, it may seem natural to give priority to the vehicle going 
straight ahead; but that perception is weakened by the significance that has been assigned to 
the major road.  An opposing thought, encouraged by experience of offset T-junctions, is that 
the right-turning vehicle is joining the major road, and so inherits the priority of major-road 
vehicles after it has turned.  But these opposing priority rules are not the only ways of 
resolving the Right Turn Problem.  Another possible rule (and the one that seems to be most 
commonly used in practice) is to give priority to whichever of the minor-road vehicles 
reached the junction first; if there are queues, a vehicle is deemed to have reached the 
junction only when it gets to the front of its queue.  Or priority might be given to the larger 
vehicle – or to the smaller.  And so on.  
 If every instance of the Right Turn Problem were exactly the same as every other, this 
multiplicity of possible rules would not be an obstacle to coordination.  For example, suppose 
that in every case the first driver to reach the junction were also the one going straight ahead.  
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Then ‘Straight ahead has priority’ and ‘First arrival has priority’ would merely be different 
ways of describing the same convention.  For the purposes of an evolutionary analysis of the 
emergence of conventions, it would not matter which of these descriptions drivers used when 
thinking about the game, or whether some used one description and some the other.  In 
reality, however, different instances of the Right Turn Problem are not identical.  In every 
case there is a straight-ahead driver and a turning driver, and in every case there is a first 
arrival and a second arrival.  But in some cases the straight-ahead driver is also the first 
arrival, and in other cases she is not.  Because of this lack of alignment of the two ways of 
describing the asymmetry in the game, the descriptions that players use do matter.  If the 
members of a population of drivers are to learn to coordinate their behaviour, they need to 
learn to use a common description of the game. 
 In this learning process, subjective perceptions of similarity may play a crucial role.  
Imagine you are a driver facing a new instance of the Right Turn Problem.  You were the 
second driver to arrive at the junction and you are turning right.  You recall just one previous 
instance of the problem.  In that case, you were the first arrival and you were turning right, 
and the other driver clearly gave way to you.  Does that recollection induce some expectation 
that the new driver will give you priority (since you are turning right) or that she will assume 
priority herself (since she was the first arrival)?  The answer seems to depend on which 
similarity relationships are more salient for you, in the sense of coming more immediately to 
mind when you compare one case with another.  If most people perceive ‘first arrival’ to be a 
more salient dimension of similarity than ‘turning right’, then one might expect a ‘first 
arrival’ convention to be more likely to emerge. 
 A related issue is the interpersonal reliability of judgements with respect to given 
dimensions of similarity.  Suppose, for example, that when two vehicles arrive at a junction at 
approximately the same time, judgements about which was the first arrival are subject to 
noise.  Then, even if both drivers follow the rule of giving priority to the perceived first 
arrival, they will not necessarily coordinate.  One might expect that effect to tend to work 
against the emergence of the ‘first arrival’ convention.  Taking another example, consider the 
rule of giving priority to the larger vehicle.  If perceptions of the largeness of vehicles differ 
between individuals, two drivers who follow this rule may fail to coordinate.  Notice that 
what ultimately matters is not whether individuals’ judgements are correct in relation to some 
objective criterion (such as the time at which a vehicle reaches a junction, or the volume or 
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mass of a vehicle), but whether they coincide.  The interpersonal reliability of similarity 
judgements depends on shared subjective perceptions.      
 We conclude that an adequate analysis of the emergence of conventions needs to take 
account of the relative salience and reliability of different conceptions of similarity that can 
be applied to the labelling of games.  This kind of analysis may seem to involve a major 
departure from mainstream game theory, but we will try to persuade the reader that the 
problems that have to be solved are theoretically tractable and amenable to experimental 
investigation. 
 
3.  A model of learning in recurrently similar games 
In this section, we develop a model of learning behaviour in a family of recurrently similar 
games – that is, games that are similar but not identical to one another and that are played 
recurrently in a population.  We assume a population that is sufficiently large to legitimate 
the use of the law of large numbers.   In each period t = 1, 2, ...,  pairs of individuals are 
drawn at random from this population to interact as co-players.  Each individual participates 
in one such interaction in each period. 
 Each interaction is a pure coordination game, defined by a set of n labels, where n ≥ 
2.  In this section we assume n = 2, but we use a notation that allows the analysis to be 
generalised.  Independently and without communication, each player sees the two labels and 
chooses one of them.  Each receives a payoff of 1 if their choices match – that is, if both 
choose the same label – and a payoff of zero otherwise.   Every label is unique, and so no two 
interactions are identical.  However, to allow a simple representation of similarity between 
games, we assume that every label has one of two features, A and B, and that in each game, 
one label has feature A and the other has feature B.  As modellers, we ‘know’ that the label 
with feature A in one game is (in this respect) similar to the label with feature A in another 
game.  But we do not assume that players can directly map these features from one game to 
another, or even that they are conscious that every game has an A and a B label.  When a 
player compares two games, it is a matter of subjective judgement for her how far (what we 
call) the A label in one game is similar to (what we call) the A label in another. 
 For example, suppose that in each game, the two labels are alternative videos of the 
behaviour of two vehicles facing the Right Turn Problem at some crossroads.  Every game 
11 
 
has a unique pair of videos.  In any given game, the only difference between the two videos is 
which vehicle gives way to which.  Since the players’ common objective can be interpreted 
as that of coordinating on an assignment of priority to one of the two vehicles, this example 
can be interpreted as a stylised model of a real-world Right Turn Problem.
6
  Suppose that in 
each game, there is one video in which the second arrival gives way to the first (feature A), 
and one in which the first arrival gives way to the second (feature B).  However, the fact that 
every pair of videos has this pair of features is not made explicit to the players.  Across 
games, other features of the videos – such as whether the first arrival is going straight ahead 
or turning right, the types of vehicle involved, the flow of traffic on the main road, the 
weather, and so on – may vary.      
 As a model of individual behaviour, we postulate the following replication heuristic.  
The heuristic has two ‘settings’.  In any period in which a given individual i is using the 
default setting, that individual chooses between labels in some way that is independent of her 
experience of previous games.  Her choice might be random, or it might be influenced by 
properties of the relevant pair of labels.  We simply assume that, in any randomly selected 
game, the default probabilities with which a randomly selected player chooses A and B are 
qA and qB, where 0 < qA, qB < 1 and qA + qB = 1.  In period 1, each individual acts on the 
default setting. 
 In each period t > 1, each individual i uses the default setting if and only if she failed 
to match with her co-player in period t – 1; otherwise the similarity setting is operative.  In 
this case, she tries to replicate the previous match by choosing whichever label in the period t 
game she perceives to be more similar to the label that she chose in the previous game.  We 
model this process by defining measures rA, rB of the intrinsic replicability of the two 
features, where 0 ≤ rA, rB < 1.  Intrinsic replicability encompasses the concepts of salience 
and reliability we introduced in Section 1. 
 For a randomly selected player in a randomly selected game, the probability with 
which A (respectively B) is chosen, conditional on that player having chosen A (respectively 
B) in the previous round and having matched with her co-player, is denoted by sA 
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 One feature of the real-world problem that has been abstracted from the model is the conflict of interest 
between real drivers about whose vehicle has priority.  In the game, players are not identified with particular 
drivers.  Thus, our model is a pure coordination game rather than a Battle of the Sexes game. 
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(respectively sB); these are measures of gross replicability.  We model the process of 
replication by: 
 sA = rA + (1 – rA)qA,  and        (1) 
 sB = rB + (1 – rB)qB.         (2)  
This specification ensures that sA and sB are strictly positive and that default probabilities 
have some influence on choice even when a player is trying to replicate a previous match; 
and it imposes the natural restriction that a player is at least as likely to choose a given type 
of label when trying to replicate another label of that type as when acting on default 
probabilities.
7
 
 The replication heuristic can be interpreted as a particularly simple and cognitively 
undemanding form of similarity-based inductive learning, in the same spirit as Gilboa and 
Schmeidler’s (1995) case-based decision theory.  Since it responds only to the success or 
failure of the individual’s own actions, it does not involve any theory of mind or strategic 
reasoning.  It requires only a one-period memory, and does not keep track of the relative 
success of alternative actions.  
 For any period t, let t be the relative frequency with which, in the whole population, 
A is chosen in that period.  We define a function f such that, for all t, t+1 = f(t).  Each game 
played in period t must have one of three outcomes – a match on A, a match on B, or no 
match.  These outcomes occur with the respective probabilities t2, (1 – t)2, and 2t(1 – t).  
It follows immediately from the specification of the replication heuristic that 
 for all t:  f(t) = t 2 sA + 2t(1 – t)qA + (1 – t)2 (1 – sB)              (3a)   
  = t 2[1 + sA – sB – 2qA] + t[2qA + 2sB – 2] + [1 – sB].             (3b) 
A stationary state or equilibrium of the model is defined by a relative frequency *  [0, 1]  
such that f(*) = *. 
 To investigate the properties of this equilibrium, notice that f is a quadratic function 
with f(0) = 1 – sB and f(1) = sA; f is everywhere convex (respectively: concave) if 1 + sA – sB 
– 2qA is positive (respectively: negative).  Equivalently, f is everywhere convex (concave) if 
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 This formulation allows the model to be extended to cases where n > 2.  The general model has label types j = 
1, ..., n, default probabilities qj  (0, 1) and intrinsic replicability measures rj  [0, 1).  Following a match on j, j 
is chosen with probability rj + (1 – rj)qj, while each k ≠ j is chosen with probability (1 – rj)qk.   
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(sA – sB) – (qA – qB) is positive (negative).  Given these properties of f, the following result is 
an immediate implication of the assumption that sA and sB are strictly positive: 
Result 1:  There is exactly one equilibrium *.  This equilibrium satisfies 0 < * < 1 
and  is globally stable.   
Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium as the intersection of the graph of y = f() with the line y = .  
(In the case illustrated, qA = qB = 0.5, rA = 0.6 and rB = 0.2, implying * = 0.59.) 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 It follows from (1), (2) and (3a) that, for all   (0, 1), f() is increasing in rA and qA 
and decreasing in rB, implying the following comparative static properties of equilibrium: 
Result 2:  Other things being equal, * increases as rA and qA increase, and as rB 
decreases. 
In other words, the replication heuristic tends to favour label types that have higher default 
probabilities and greater intrinsic replicability.  The following result gives some feel for the 
trade-off between decreases in default probability and increases in replicability:  
Result 3:  * is greater than (equal to, less than) 0.5 if and only if sA – sB is greater 
than (equal to, less than) qB – qA.  
Proofs of Results 3, 4 and 5 are presented in the Appendix. 
 Our next result concerns the effects of varying the intrinsic replicability of A and B 
together while maintaining equality between rA and rB.  Because of the symmetry between A 
and B, there is no loss of generality in considering only the case in which qA ≥ 0.5:   
Result 4:  Assume rA = rB = r and qA ≥ 0.5.  Then: 
(i)  if r = 0, * = qA;  
(ii)  if qA = 0.5, then * = 0.5 for all r  [0, 1); 
(iii)  if qA > 0.5, then as r  1, *  1;  
(iv)  if qA > 0.5, then * > qA for all r  (0, 1). 
 This result shows that the overall effect of the replication heuristic is to magnify 
dispersion in the distribution of default probabilities, and hence to increase the frequency of 
coordination relative to the default benchmark.  Obviously (given the symmetry between the 
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two label types, and given the assumption that they have equal intrinsic replicability r), if A 
and B have equal default probabilities, then they are chosen with equal frequency in 
equilibrium.  But part (iv) of Result 4 establishes that if A has strictly greater default 
probability and if r > 0, the frequency with which A is chosen is not only greater than 0.5; it 
is strictly greater than the default probability qA.  Intuitively, this is because replication is 
activated by matching.  If players choose according to default probabilities, the ratio between 
choices of A and choices of B is qA:qB, but the ratio of matches on A to matches on B is 
qA
2:qB
2.  If qA > 0.5, the latter ratio is greater than the former, and so replication works 
disproportionally in favour of A.  The higher the value of r, the greater the effect of this 
disproportion on the equilibrium; as r tends to one, the equilibrium frequency of A choices 
tends to one also.   
 Finally, we consider whether each individual benefits by using the replication 
heuristic, rather than by acting on default probabilities.  Consider any individual i.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, we use qA, qB, rA and rB to denote the default probabilities and 
intrinsic replicabilities that are relevant in determining i’s behaviour; we continue to assume 
0 < qA, qB < 1, qA + qB = 1, and 0 ≤ rA, rB < 1.  Let   [0, 1] be the (constant) relative 
frequency with which A is played in the population, and hence (given the assumption that the 
population is large) the probability that A is chosen by i’s co-player in each game.  We make 
no assumptions about the determinants of  or about the relationship between  and qA.  In 
particular, we do not assume that i’s co-players have the same default probabilities as i does, 
nor that they use the replication heuristic.  We assume only that their behaviour has some 
consistent pattern, described by .  Is i’s expected payoff per round greater if her decision 
rule is the replication heuristic (‘rule R’) than if it is the use of default probabilities (‘rule 
D’)? 
 In general, the answer to this question depends on qA, rA, rB and .  (For example, if  
> 0.5 and rA < rB, replication works in the ‘wrong’ direction; if this effect is sufficiently 
strong, i might get a higher expected payoff by using D rather than R.)  But a sharp answer is 
possible for all cases in which A and B have the same intrinsic replicability: 
Result 5:   Consider any individual i for whom the default probabilities and intrinsic 
replicabilities of A and B are qA, qB and rA, rB, where rA = rB = r > 0.  Suppose that, 
in every period, i’s co-player chooses A with some constant probability   [0, 1].  
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Let v(D, t) be i’s expected payoff in period t, conditional on her using rule D in all 
periods.  Let v(R, t) be i’s expected payoff in period t, conditional on her using rule R 
in all periods.  Then v(R, t) ≥ v(D, t) for all t.  If  ≠ 0.5, v(R, t) > v(D, t) for all t > 1. 
 At first sight, it might seem surprising that, given only the assumptions rA = rB > 0 
and  ≠ 0.5, rule R can be shown to be unambiguously superior to rule D.  The key to the 
proof is that, when individual i uses rule R, the effect of replication is always to increase the 
probability with which she chooses the label type that her co-players choose more frequently.  
This is the case because the replication heuristic does not try to replicate whatever co-players 
do; it tries only to replicate matches. For example, consider the case  = 0.6, qA = 0.9, r = 0.3.  
If i tried to replicate her co-players’ behaviour in general, the probability with which she 
chose A would tend to fall from its default level.  But because the replication heuristic is 
activated only by matches, this probability will tend to increase.  Suppose, for example, that 
in period 1, i matches with her co-player.  The posterior probability that this match was on A 
is (0.9)(0.6)/ [(0.9)(0.6) + (0.1)(0.4)] = 0.931.  Thus, the probability that i chooses A in period 
2 is (0.931)[0.3 + (0.7)(0.9)] + (0.069)(0.7)(0.9) = 0.909, which is greater than qA.  
 To sum up, we have described a very simple heuristic based on the principle of 
choosing actions that are similar to actions that have proved successful in the immediate past.  
When this heuristic is used by populations of players of recurrently similar pure coordination 
games, there is a tendency for the emergence of conventions that are based on shared 
perceptions of similarity.  Other things being equal, this process tends to favour those 
putative conventions that have higher default probabilities and higher intrinsic replicability. 
 A convention that is based on labelling similarities works by picking out specific 
labels in individual games, and so can be interpreted as a source of salience, in Schelling’s 
sense of the term (or, to be strictly accurate, in the sense of Schelling’s use of the term 
‘prominence’).  Thus, the emergence of such conventions can also be understood as the 
emergence of conceptions of salience.  We suggest that the conceptions that are favoured by 
this process have at least something in common with those features of labels that distinguish 
focal points in one-shot coordination games.  In the theoretical and experimental literature, 
one recurring idea is that focal points are grounded in primary salience – that is, in 
individuals’ predispositions to choose some labels rather than others, in the absence of any 
strategic or payoff-related reasons to do so (Lewis, 1969; Mehta et al., 1994a; Bardsley et al., 
2010).  This idea can be developed by using level-k or cognitive hierarchy theories, in which 
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pre-strategic dispositions are attributed to players who reason at ‘level 0’ (Stahl and Wilson, 
1995; Camerer et al., 2004; Crawford et al., 2008).  The default probabilities of our model 
capture something of the same idea.  Another recurring idea is that focal points are 
distinguished by properties of uniqueness in their labelling.  Thus, in games with a finite 
number of labels, labels that are perceived as ‘odd-ones-out’ tend to be chosen, even if they 
are not primarily salient (Schelling, 1960; Bacharach and Stahl, 2000; Casajus, 2001; 
Janssen, 2001; Bacharach, 2006; Bardsley et al., 2010).  It is plausible to suppose that, in 
families of games with clearly-defined odd-ones-out, the odd-one-out type of label will 
generally have high intrinsic replicability.  Of course, we do not mean to suggest that salient 
solutions to artificial coordination games (such as ‘12 noon’ in Schelling’s ‘Name a time to 
meet’ game) have emerged from recurrent play of those specific games.  But we do suggest 
that, in repeatedly dealing with a variety of real-world coordination problems, people may 
have learned that it is generally in their interests to choose strategies whose labels have 
obvious properties of uniqueness.        
 We do not claim that our simple model captures all the important features of the 
process by which, in reality, people learn to play recurrently similar coordination games.  Our 
aim has been to demonstrate the feasibility of modelling similarity-based learning about 
labels, and to show that such learning imparts a tendency for the emergence of conventions 
based on replicable similarity relationships.  There are many ways in which the model might 
be developed to make it more realistic, but we conjecture that this tendency would remain.  
For example, our simple model assumes that, after failing to achieve a match in any period, a 
player reverts with probability 1 to her default strategy.  One alternative possibility would be 
to assume that, with some positive probability, such a player continues to try to replicate the 
most recent previous match.  Another possibility would be to assume that, with some positive 
probability, a player who has failed to match in the previous period tries to replicate the 
choice that her co-player made in that period.
8
  Either of these revisions would reduce the 
extent to which equilibrium was influenced by default probabilities, but they would not 
displace the crucial mechanism of the simple model, namely players’ attempts to replicate 
                                                          
8
 Since the behaviour of a previous co-player provides evidence about the likely behaviour of the current co-
player, each of these revisions can be interpreted as assuming that players are more rational than in the simple 
model. 
17 
 
one another’s choices.  Whenever such a mechanism is at work, there will be a tendency for 
emergent conventions to be based on those labelling features that are most replicable.
9
  
 
4.  Some experimental evidence 
In this section, we discuss some evidence of learning behaviour in an experimental 
implementation of recurrently similar pure coordination games.  We must emphasise that this 
experiment was not designed to test hypotheses deriving from the model presented in Section 
2.  To the contrary, the experiment was exploratory.  Its aim was to investigate learning in 
recurrently similar coordination games, but no specific learning heuristics were chosen in 
advance to be tested.  Our model was developed in the process of trying to understand the 
data generated by the experiment.  The experiment is reported in another paper (Alberti et al., 
2010).   In this paper, we merely summarise its main features and describe some of the results 
that informed our modelling work.   
 The experiment involved 118 student subjects, randomly and anonymously assigned 
to pairs; pairings were maintained for the duration of the experiment.  Fixed pairings were 
used to simplify the subjects’ learning problem and to allow conventions to emerge relatively 
quickly.  The experiment used forty pure coordination games.  Each pair of subjects played 
all of these games, but not in the same order.  Each game was defined by a set of four labels 
or images.  Players were instructed to try to match with their co-players, and were paid in 
proportion to the number of matches they achieved.
10
  After each game, players were told 
which images their co-players had chosen, thus allowing opportunities for them to learn from 
one another’s behaviour.  Games were presented in ‘blocks’ of five similar games; each pair 
of subjects played all the games in one block before moving on to another block.  There were 
four blocks of culture-laden games and four of abstract games.  Each pair of subjects either 
played all the culture-laden games before playing the abstract ones, or vice versa; which type 
of game was played first was counterbalanced. 
                                                          
9
 In other words, we conjecture that for a wide class of learning models, analogues of Results 1, 2 and (in the 
sense that increases in intrinsic replicability and decreases in default probability offset one another) Result 3 will 
hold.  Results 4 and 5 depend on the more specific assumption that players try to replicate successes. 
10
 In each experimental session, the payment per match was calculated ex post by dividing a total pool of £10 
per subject in proportion to matches achieved.  This payment mechanism gives each subject an incentive to 
achieve as many matches as possible, while giving no incentive for subjects to form collusive agreements before 
entering the experiment. 
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 In each game in each culture-laden block, each of the four images was an example of 
a different style; the same four styles appeared in each game.  However, this feature of the 
design was deliberately not made explicit to subjects, who were told only that every game 
was made up of four ‘pictures’.  Figure 2 shows two games from a block of culture-laden 
games in which the images are fabric designs and styles represent particular periods in the 
history of fashion in western society.  In the figure, images with the same style appear above 
one another.  In the experiment, however, the positions of the images were randomised 
independently for each co-player, so that position could not be used as a coordinating device.  
In two blocks the images were fabric designs; in the other two they were paintings.  In the 
latter case, each style corresponded with a specific painter; within a game, the subject matter 
of the four paintings was (as far as possible) similar.  Each block used a distinct set of four 
styles (fashion periods or painters).  The images for all culture-laden games are available 
from the authors.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
 Figure 3 shows two games from a block of abstract games.  In these games, there 
were no pre-determined styles.  Although the twenty abstract games were presented to 
subjects in blocks of five, all games were constructed on the same principles.  Each image is 
a chequered pattern of coloured squares, using three distinct colours in a common pattern.  In 
any given game, two fixed colours and their respective positions are held constant across all 
four images.  The third variable colour is different in each of the four images.  This design 
feature induces a general resemblance between the images in any given game.  Subject to the 
constraints we have described (and the additional constraint that no two images in a given 
game should be identical) colours were selected at random from a pre-determined set of 
forty-eight colours, which had been constructed so that no two colours were difficult to 
distinguish from one another; the location of the variable colour was also selected at random.  
The images for all abstract games are available from the authors. 
[Figure 3 near here] 
 Before playing the twenty abstract (respectively: culture-laden) games, each subject 
completed a questionnaire in which, in turn, she was shown eight sets of four abstract 
(culture-laden) images.  For each set, she was asked to record which of the four images she 
‘liked most’ and which she ‘thought the person whom she was paired with liked most’.  In 
fact (although this was not revealed to the subject at the time), these were the sets of images 
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that would appear in the first and last games that the subject played in each of the four blocks 
of abstract (culture-laden) games.  Clearly, this questionnaire might have made subjects more 
conscious than they would otherwise have been of ‘liking’ as a rule for coordination.  Thus if 
(as in fact was the case) there was a general tendency for subjects to choose the labels they 
most liked, that should not be used as evidence that liking is an important ingredient of 
salience in one-shot games.
11
  But the aim of the experiment was to investigate how players’ 
behaviour evolved over a series of recurrently similar games.  For this purpose, the source of 
players’ initial ideas about salience is immaterial.  In fact, there was very little correlation 
between the likings of different subjects, indicating that in this experiment, liking would not 
be a successful coordination rule.
12
 
 For any given game, we define the matching frequency as the relative frequency with 
which co-players chose the same image.  Following Mehta et al. (1994a), we define the 
coordination index for a game as the probability that two distinct players, selected at random 
from the whole population of players, chose the same image.  This latter statistic uses 
individuals’ actual choices, but (in contrast to the matching frequency) does not take account 
of who was paired with whom.  As a benchmark, notice that (given that we are dealing with a 
four-label game) if all players choose at random, then the expected values of both the 
matching frequency and the coordination index are 0.25.  The extent to which the 
coordination index exceeds 0.25 is a measure of positive correlation between choices among 
subjects in general.  The extent to which the matching frequency exceeds the coordination 
index measures any additional pair-specific correlation. 
 Table 1 presents some summary statistics about matching frequencies and 
coordination indices for different types of game and at different stages in the experiment.  We 
use the term ‘round’ to refer to the order in which games were played.  Thus, for each set of 
twenty games of the same type (culture-laden or abstract), ‘rounds 1–10’ refers to the first ten 
games of that type faced by any pair of subjects, while ‘rounds 11–20’ refers to the remaining 
games of that type.  Because the order in which games were faced by different pairs was 
randomised, comparisons between data for ‘rounds 1–10’ and ‘rounds 11–20’ pick up effects 
                                                          
11
 But probably it is.  Bardsley et al. (2010) find a strong tendency for players of pure coordination games to use 
‘liking’ (or ‘favouriteness’) as a means of coordination. 
12
 For responses to questions about which image the subject liked most, the average coordination index (defined 
in the next paragraph) was 0.289 for abstract games and 0.287 for culture-laden games.  Coordination indices 
for questions about co-players’ likings were even closer to the random-response benchmark of 0.25. 
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of experience.  The table also reports tests of whether matching frequencies are significantly 
greater than coordination indices, and whether coordination indices are significantly greater 
than 0.25.
13
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 Notice that coordination indices, although consistently and significantly greater than 
the 0.25 benchmark, are typically quite close to 0.25, even in the later stages of the 
experiment.  In contrast, matching frequencies are markedly and significantly greater than 
coordination indices.  The increase in the matching frequency for abstract games between 
rounds 1–10 (0.361) and rounds 11–20 (0.423) suggests that, by using their experience of 
playing recurrently similar games, co-players were able to increase their success in matching.  
It is perhaps not surprising that a similar effect was not observed for culture-laden games, for 
which each five-game block had its own characteristics and styles.   
 It seems clear that some kind of similarity-based learning occurred.  Since co-players 
were matched at random, the only credible explanation of the excess of matching frequencies 
over coordination indices is that subjects learned something from their co-players’ behaviour, 
that this learning facilitated matching, and that different pairs followed different learning 
paths.
14
   In a general sense, any learning that facilitates matching in recurrently similar 
games must exploit similarity relations between games: if players did not perceive similarities 
between the games they played, they would have no way of using what they learned in one 
game to guide their decisions in another.  But the fact that learning was predominantly pair-
specific provides a further clue about what was being learned.  During the course of the 
experiment, the only feedback that each player received was information about her co-
player’s choices.  So this information (and this information alone) must have been the input 
to pair-specific learning.  That is, players must have adapted their own choices in response to 
their co-players’ earlier choices.  Since the overall effect of this adaptation was to increase 
                                                          
13
 The first test was carried out by using repeated random reassignments of subjects to pairs.  For each such 
pairing, we calculated the average matching frequency (MF) implied by subjects’ actual choices, thus 
generating a probability distribution of MF consistent with the null hypothesis of no pair-specific correlation.  
The second test used repeated simulation of random choices to generate a probability distribution of the 
coordination index consistent with the null hypothesis of random choice. 
14
 In principle, an excess of matching frequencies over coordination indices could be an artefact of the formula 
for calculating coordination indices, which pools games played in different rounds.  If, over the course of the 
experiment and independently of her co-player’s behaviour, each subject became more skilled at playing the 
game, coordination indices would exceed matching frequencies.  But the absence of any marked upward trend in 
coordination indices counts strongly against this explanation. 
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matching, and since different pairs followed different learning paths, the obvious inference is 
that in some way, players adapted their decision rules to favour choices that were similar to 
their co-players’ previous choices. 
 Further evidence about this adaptation process is provided by the data on subjects’ 
‘likings’, as reported in the questionnaire.  When playing their first culture-laden or first 
abstract game, subjects were very likely to choose the label that they most liked (the 
proportions were 0.686 for culture-laden games and 0.593 for abstract).  The frequency with 
which most-liked images were chosen tended to decline over the twenty relevant games, but 
remained well above 0.25 throughout; and there was a spike at the start of each new block of 
games.
15
  This pattern suggests that subjects used their own likings as a default rule, but that 
as they played more games of a given type, they adapted their own decision rules to favour 
choices similar to those that had been made by their co-players.  The fact that the default rule 
was liking, rather than some other concept of salience, might perhaps be attributed to the 
questionnaire.  But this rule was clearly not responsible for subjects’ success in coordination.  
(Recall that there was very little correlation between subjects’ likings, and that coordination 
indices were consistently low.)  That success must have been due to pair-specific learning of 
other rules. 
 To make more direct inferences about the learning mechanisms that subjects used, we 
focus on some specific similarity relationships between games.  For each block of culture-
laden games, the four styles provide a pre-defined set of similarity relationships between 
games (analogous with features A and B in our model).  We investigate how (if at all) 
subjects used these relationships.  We do not assume that these are the only concepts of 
similarity that players can use; the significance of styles is merely that they allow us to 
identify one set of well-defined similarity relationships.  We can then investigate whether 
there was any tendency for these particular similarity relationships to be used by players to 
increase the probability of coordination. 
 We now explain our method of analysis.  Take any block of five similar culture-laden 
games and any given subject i.  We define periods t = 1, ..., 5 to specify the order in which 
these games were played by i and her co-player.  Take any of the four styles that is defined 
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  For more details, see Alberti et al. (2010).  Which image a subject most liked was a better predictor of her 
choices than which image she thought her co-player most liked. 
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for these games, and denote this by s.  For each period t = 2, ..., 5 we know whether i and/or 
her co-player chose style s in period t – 1, and whether i chose style j in period t.  If i were 
using a similarity-based learning rule, and if she recognised the similarity relationship 
described by style s, we should expect that, other things being equal, she would be more 
likely to choose s in t if her co-player had chosen s in t – 1 than otherwise.  If attempts at 
replication were activated only by immediately previous matches (as in the simple model 
presented in Section 2), this tendency would be restricted to cases in which both players had 
chosen s in t – 1. 
 Aggregating across all culture-laden blocks, all relevant styles s, all subjects i and all 
periods t = 2, ...5, there are 441184 = 7552 ‘observations’.  Each observation can be 
classified by whether, in t – 1, s was chosen (i) by both i and her co-player, or (ii) only by i, 
or (iii) only by i’s co-player, or (iv) by neither.  It can also be classified by whether, in t, s 
was or was not chosen by i.  This cross-tabulation is reported in Table 2.  For each of the 
cases (i) to (iv), the first column reports the total number of observations.  The second 
column reports the absolute frequency of choices of style s.  The third column reports the 
unweighted relative frequency of such choices, defined as the ratio of the entry in the second 
column to the entry in the first.  The fourth column reports the weighted relative frequency of 
choices of style s, arrived at by calculating the relative frequency of such choices for each 
style separately and taking the mean.  The weighted measure controls for the potential bias 
that, even in the absence of learning, matching will tend to be more common on styles that 
are more frequently chosen. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 As one would expect, there is a tendency for subjects to replicate their own previous 
style choices, even when those previous choices had not lead to matches.  The ‘i only’ row of 
the table shows that, following periods in which two co-players failed to match, the weighted 
relative frequency with which subjects repeated their own previous style choices was 0.308, 
compared with the random-choice benchmark of 0.250.  This may indicate that the default 
choices of styles by given subjects were positively correlated across games.  (For example, a 
subject’s default rule might be to choose according to her likings, and she might like some 
styles more than others.)  Alternatively, it might indicate that some subjects were consciously 
trying to replicate their own previous choices as a means of facilitating coordination. 
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 For our purposes, it is more important to see that subjects tended to replicate their co-
players’ style choices.  As noted above, subjects who had failed to match in one period 
repeated their own previous style choices with a weighted relative frequency of 0.308.  But 
for subjects who had matched, the corresponding frequency was 0.449.  Another relevant 
comparison is between the ‘neither’ and ‘co-player only’ entries.  When subjects had failed to 
match, styles which neither player had chosen in the previous round were chosen with a 
weighted relative frequency of 0.184 (per style: there were two such styles), while the style 
that the co-player had chosen in the previous round was chosen with a weighted relative 
frequency of 0.292. 
 To test for the significance of these effects, and to investigate whether some styles 
were more replicable than others, we carried out a random-effects probit regression analysis 
for each style.  For each style s, the dependent variable was an individual’s propensity to 
choose style s in period t = 2, ..., 4; the independent variables were a dummy to represent 
whether i had chosen s in t – 1 (own choice), and a dummy to represent whether i’s co-player 
had chosen s in t – 1 (other’s choice). 
 The regression analysis revealed marked differences between styles.  We will use the 
term ‘Style 1.2’ to refer to style 2 in block 1, and so on.16  The own choice coefficient was 
significantly positive at the 5 per cent level in six cases – styles 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.4, 4.3 and 4.4.  
In four of these cases (styles 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.4) it was significant at the 1 per cent level.  The 
other’s choice coefficient was significantly positive at the 5 per cent level in seven  cases – 
styles 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, 3.4 and 4.3.  In six of these cases (all except style 3.3) it was 
significant at the 1 per cent level.  The high levels of significance found for some styles, and 
the extent of overlap between the sets of styles that were significant in the two regressions, 
suggest that what we have found is not random variation.  We conclude that there was a 
systematic tendency for subjects to replicate their co-players’ style choices, but that this 
effect was highly style-specific: some styles were much more likely to be replicated than 
others.   We tried adding an interaction term to the regressions to pick up the specific effect 
of a previous match, but this was statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in only one of 
the sixteen regressions.  
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 The games shown in Figure 2 are from block 2; from left to right, the four images in each game exhibit styles 
2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.   
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 We now turn to the abstract games, which do not have pre-determined styles.  We 
suggest that one salient way of distinguishing between the four images in a game is in terms 
of the variable colour.  Thus, for example, in abstract game A2 (shown in the top row of 
Figure 3), the variable colours (from left to right) might be perceived as ‘pale turquoise’, 
‘purple’, ‘green’ and ‘dark blue’.  Suppose that, in one round of the experiment, a pair of 
players face this game and match on the image on the left.  In the next round, they face 
abstract game A3 (shown in the bottom row of Figure 3).  If a player tries to replicate the 
previous match, which image in game A3 is most similar to the image chosen in game A2?  
One possible answer is that since the image chosen in game A2 was the palest of the four, the 
palest image in game A3 (presumably the third from the left) should be chosen.  
 By virtue of the way in which the experiment was computerised, each of the forty-
eight colours is described by a unique triple of parameters (xR, xG, xB) where xj  [0, 1] is the 
intensity of colour j, and where j is one of the three primary colours for light (R = red, G = 
green, B = blue).  These parameters allow us, as analysts, to define colour-based similarity 
rules in an objective way.  For the purposes of our analysis, we define eight different 
similarity rules.  One rule is ‘choose the most red’, which we operationalise as ‘maximise 
xR/(xR + xG + xB)’.  (Because colour mixes are defined in terms of light rather than pigment, a 
high value of (xR + xG + xB) represents a ‘pale’ or ‘unsaturated’ colour, that is, a colour close 
to white.)  The rules ‘choose the most green’ and ‘choose the most blue’ are defined 
analogously.  Similarly, the rule ‘choose the least red’ is operationalised as ‘maximise (1 – 
xR)/[(1 – xR) + (1 – xG) + (1 – xB)]’.  The rules ‘choose the least green’ and ‘choose the least 
blue’ are defined analogously.  Colours at the ‘least blue’ extreme appear yellow; ‘least 
green’ colours appear purple, and ‘least red’ colours appear turquoise.  Our final two rules 
use the unsaturated/saturated dimension.  The rules ‘choose the most pale’ and ‘choose the 
least pale’ are operationalised as ‘maximise xR + xG + xB’ and ‘minimise xR + xG + xB’ 
respectively.  For consistency with our discussion of culture-laden games, we will sometimes 
refer to ‘most red’, ‘least pale’ and so on as ‘styles’; thus an image that is uniquely picked out 
by the rule ‘choose the most red’ has the style ‘most red’. 
 Typically, each of these rules identifies a unique image in each game.  (In 
approximately five per cent of cases, the maximisation or minimisation criterion of a 
similarity rule is satisfied by two or more images.
17
)   Since there are eight similarity rules but 
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 For example, in game A3, the first and fourth images jointly satisfy the ‘most blue’ criterion. 
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only four images in each game, a given image is often picked by more than one rule.  (For 
example, in game A2, image 3 is ‘least pale’, ‘most green’, and ‘least blue’.)  When this is 
the case, two co-players who use different similarity rules to replicate a given previous match 
are likely to fail to coordinate.  It is thus particularly interesting to ask whether some colour-
based similarity rules are more salient than others (in the sense discussed in Section 1).  
 Table 3 has the same structure as Table 2.  Since each subject faced twenty abstract 
games of the same basic type, periods are defined by t = 1, ..., 20.  The 17 022 ‘observations’ 
are restricted to cases in which the relevant similarity rule identified a unique image both in 
period t – 1 and in period t, with t  2.  Notice that this implies that, if players choose at 
random, each style s will be chosen with probability 0.25 in all cases that are included in the 
analysis.  The data show the same qualitative patterns as were found for culture-laden games: 
subjects tended to replicate both their own style choices and those of their co-players. 
 As in the case of culture-laden games, we carried out a random-effects probit 
regression analysis for each style.  The interaction term between own choice and other’s 
choice was significant at the 5 per cent level in only one regression and so was dropped.  In 
the resulting equations, the own choice coefficient was significantly positive at the 5 per cent 
level in two cases – ‘most blue’ and ‘least blue’.  In one of these cases (‘most blue’) it was 
significant at the 1 per cent level.  The other’s choice coefficient was significantly positive at 
the 5 per cent level in five cases – ‘most red’, ‘most green’, ‘most blue’, ‘least green’ and 
‘least blue’.  In two of these cases (‘most blue’ and ‘least green’) it was significant at the 1 
per cent level.  Again there seems to be a systematic but style-specific tendency for subjects 
to replicate their co-players’ style choices. 
 Overall, the results of the experiment support the hypothesis that, when playing 
recurrently similar coordination games, individuals use similarity relations between the labels 
of successive games as a means of facilitating coordination.  The crucial mechanism is that of 
players trying to choose strategies that are similar to those previously chosen by their co-
players.  The experimental results also suggest that some similarity relations are more likely 
to be used, or to be used successfully, than others.  In these respects, the results support the 
general modelling strategy we have proposed. 
 However, we must acknowledge that our regression results do not support the 
hypothesis that players specifically try to replicate previous matches.  Given that the 
repeating of previously successful rules or actions is the core mechanism of models of 
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reinforcement learning, this negative result is perhaps surprising.  We suggest that it could be 
connected with the fact that the experiment used fixed pairs of players, rather than randomly 
reassigning subjects to pairs between games.  This set-up may prompt subjects to try to 
anticipate their co-players’ choices, rather than passively responding to successes.  We must 
also report that, aggregating across all subjects, we were unable to find any systematic trends 
in the relative frequencies with which different styles were chosen over the five-game 
sequences of culture-laden games or over the twenty-game sequence of abstract games.
18
  
 
5.  Conclusion  
We have shown how a simple form of experiential learning can lead to the emergence of 
conventions that are defined in terms of similarity relations between the labels that 
individuals use to describe games to themselves.  We have also shown how the evolutionary 
selection of conventions can be influenced by the comparative replicability properties of 
different similarity relations.   We do not claim that our stripped-down representation of 
experiential learning can explain all the ingredients of ‘salience’, understood as the defining 
characteristic of focal points in one-shot coordination games.  But we suggest that it provides 
some clues about how conceptions of salience might begin to emerge, and hence about the 
possibility of a common source for those properties of salience that we can all recognise but 
which conventional game theory seems unable to represent.   
  Some readers of previous versions of this paper have suggested that, in our treatment 
of salience, we have merely shunted a well-known problem from one track to another, or 
kicked an unwanted can further down a road.  We strongly disagree.  As we have explained, 
most evolutionary game theorists have worked on the assumption – explicit or more usually 
implicit – that an analysis of conventions need take no account of labelling.  They may 
recognise the truth of Schelling’s hypothesis that properties of labelling are sometimes 
important for equilibrium selection in one-shot games, but they do not see that as relevant for 
evolutionary analysis.  Why not?  The answer is surely that, in the standard tool-box of 
evolutionary game theory, there is no plausible mechanism that could explain how labels 
affect the kinds of experiential learning that the theory is intended to represent.  We have 
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 For example, the coordination indices for abstract games played in rounds 1–10 and 11–20 were 0.282 and 
0.281 respectively (see Table 1).  If subjects’ choices had been converging on a limited number of styles, there 
would have been an upward trend in the coordination index. 
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proposed just such a mechanism.  The two main components of this mechanism – default 
choice probabilities and the relative replicability of different labelling features – can be 
investigated empirically.  What is more, they can be investigated in non-strategic settings.
19
  
So these concepts are not just re-descriptions of the fact that some strategies in a game are 
chosen more frequently than others: they are elements of a potential explanation of empirical 
phenomena.  This explanation may turn out to be correct or incorrect; but unless salience is to 
be treated only as a mysterious footnote to game theory, potential explanations of its effects 
must be proposed and tested.  
  
                                                          
19
 Default choices can be investigated in experiments in which subjects are asked to ‘just pick’ one of a set of 
labels, with no incentive to pick any label rather than any other (Mehta et al., 1994a; Bardsley et al., 2010).  
Similarity judgements are an established topic of psychological research (e.g.Tversky, 1977); one investigative 
strategy would be to show subjects two sets of labels, pick out one label in one set and then ask subjects to 
report which label in the second set is most similar to it. 
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Table 1:  Matching frequencies and coordination indices 
     average matching frequency (MF) and coordination index (CI) for: 
      culture-laden games      abstract games 
     MF  CI  MF  CI 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
all games    0.369***     0.280***  0.392*** 0.284*** 
culture-laden block 1 (fabrics)  0.356*  0.316*** 
culture-laden block 2 (fabrics)  0.407*** 0.263*** 
culture-laden block 3 (paintings)  0.346*** 0.280*** 
culture-laden block 4 (paintings)  0.366*** 0.263*** 
games played in rounds 1–10  0.367**  0.282*** 0.361*  0.298*** 
games played in rounds 11–20  0.370**  0.281*** 0.423*** 0.274*** 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Asterisks in the MF columns report bootstrap tests of the hypothesis that MF is higher than CI.  Asterisks in the 
CI columns report bootstrap tests of the hypothesis that CI is greater than 0.25  (10, 5 and 1 per cent significance 
are shown by *, ** and *** respectively). 
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Table 2:  Replication of styles between periods: culture-laden games   
 
     
    number of  style s chosen by player i in period t:   
    observations  _____________________________________ 
       absolute unweighted weighted  
       frequency relative relative 
         frequency frequency 
__________________________________________________________________________
   
in t–1, s chosen by: 
 
i  and co-player    682    356  0.522  0.449   
i only   1206   378  0.313  0.308 
co-player only  1206   362  0.300  0.292 
neither   4458   792  0.178  0.184 
 
total   7552                      1888   ––   ––         
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3:  Replication of styles between periods: abstract games   
 
     
    number of  style s chosen by player i in period t:   
    observations  _____________________________________ 
       absolute unweighted weighted  
       frequency relative relative 
         frequency frequency 
__________________________________________________________________________
   
in t–1, s chosen by: 
 
i  and co-player  1888    696  0.369  0.354   
i only   2697    796  0. 295  0.293 
co-player only  2697    769  0. 285  0.282 
neither   9740   2144  0. 220  0.224  
  
total   17022   4405  ––   ––         
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1:  Equilibrium 
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  Figure 2:  Two culture-laden games 
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game C7 
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 Figure 3:  Two abstract games 
 
game A2 
 
 
game A3 
 
 
The variable colours (xR, xG, xB) in the four A2 images are, from left to right: (0.88, 1.0, 1.0), (0.54, 
0.17, 0.89), (0.0, 0.5, 0.0) and (0.0, 0.0, 1.0).  The variable colours in the A3 images are  (1.0, 0.0, 
1.0), (1.0, 0.63, 0.48), (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) and (0, 1.0, 1.0). 
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Appendix 1:  Proofs of results 
Results 1 and 2 are proved in the main text. 
Proof of Result 3 
It is evident from Figure 1 that * is greater than (equal to, less than) 0.5 if and only if f(0.5) 
is greater than (respectively: equal to, less than) 0.5.  From (3a): 
 f(0.5) > (= , <) 0.5  iff  0.25sA + 0.5qA + 0.25
 (1 – sB) > (=, <) 0.5. 
Since qA + qB = 1, this can be rewritten as: 
 f(0.5) > (= , <) 0.5  iff  0.25(sA – sB) > (=, <) 0.25(qA + qB) – 0.5qA 
or: 
 f(0.5) > (= , <) 0.5  iff  sA – sB  > (=, <)  qB – qA. 
 
Proof of Result 4 
Assume rA = rB = r and qA ≥ 0.5.   
 To prove part (i), assume r = 0.  Then sA = qA and sB = 1 – qA.  Thus, using (3a), f() 
= qA for all   (0, 1).  Since equilibrium is defined by f(*) = *, * = qA. 
 To prove part (ii), assume qA = 0.5.  Then sA – sB = qB – qA = 0.  Thus, by Result 3, * 
= 0.5. 
 To prove part (iii), assume qA > 0.5.  As r  1, sA, sB  1. Thus, using (3a):   
 for all   (0, 1):  as r  1,  f() –     2 + 2(1 – )qA – .  (A1) 
But 
  2 + 2(1 – )qA –  = (2qA – 1)(1 – ),     (A2) 
which (given qA > 0.5) is positive for all   (0, 1).  Thus, in the limit as r  1, f() >  at all 
 < 1, implying *  1. 
 To prove part (iv), it is sufficient to prove that if r > 0,then qA > 0.5 implies f(qA) – qA 
> 0.  From (3b): 
 f(qA) – qA  =  qA2[1 + sA – sB – 2qA] + qA[2qA + 2sB – 3] + [1 – sB].  (A4) 
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Using (1) and (2) and rearranging: 
 f(qA) – qA = qA r (2qA – 1)(1 – qA),      (A5) 
which is strictly positive if qA > 0.5 and r > 0. 
 
Proof of Result 5 
Notice that if  = 0.5, then v(D, t) = v(R, t) = 0.5 for all t.  Notice also that, because the two 
decision rules prescribe the same behaviour in period 1, v(D, 1) = v(R, 1).  Thus, given the 
symmetry between A and B, it is sufficient for a proof of Result 5 to show that if r > 0 and  
> 0.5, then v(R, t) > v(D, t) for all t > 1. 
 Assume r > 0 and  > 0.5.  Consider any period t > 1.  First suppose that i did not 
match with her co-player in period t – 1.  Then, irrespective of whether she is using rule D or 
rule R, she chooses A in period t with probability qA, and so her expected payoff in t is the 
same for both rules. 
 Now suppose instead that i did match with her co-player in t – 1.  If she is using rule 
D, she chooses A in t with probability qA.  But suppose she is using rule R.  For periods T = 1, 
..., t, let T denote the probability with which i chose (or chooses) A in T.  First, we show 
(Lemma 1) that t–1 ≥ qA implies t > qA. 
 Assume t–1 ≥ qA.  Conditional on i having matched in t – 1, the probability that this 
match was on A is given by: 
 mt –1    t–1  / [t–1  + (1 – t–1)(1 – )].                     (A6) 
Thus: 
 mt –1 > qA     t–1  / [t–1  + (1 – t–1)(1 – )] > qA.   (A7)  
The right-hand side of (A6) is increasing in t–1.  Thus, since t–1 ≥ qA,   
 qA  / [qA  + (1 – qA)(1 – )] > qA     mt –1 > qA .    (A8) 
But  > 0.5 implies that the antecedent of (A8) holds, proving that mt –1 > qA .  
 From the assumption that i uses rule R: 
 t  = mt –1 [r + (1 – r)qA]  + (1 – mt –1)(1 – r)qA 
39 
 
 =  qA + r(mt –1 – qA).        (A9) 
Since mt –1 > qA and r > 0, (A9) implies t > qA, proving Lemma 1. 
 Maintaining the assumptions that t > 1, that i matched in t – 1, and that i is using rule 
R, we define k as the number of successive periods, immediately prior to t, in which i 
matched.  (In other words: i matched in periods t – 1, t – 2, ..., t – k; and either t – k = 1 or i 
failed to match in t – k – 1.)   Suppose k = 1, i.e. i failed to match in t – 2.  Then t–1 = qA, and 
so t > qA by Lemma 1.  Now suppose k = 2.  Then t–2 = qA, and so t-1 > qA by Lemma 1.  
Applying Lemma 1 again, t > qA.  This argument can be repeated for k = 3, 4, ..., 
establishing t > qA for all k. 
 If  > 0.5, i’s expected payoff in any given period is higher, the higher the probability 
with which she chooses A.  If i uses rule D, she chooses A with probability qA in all periods.  
We have established that if  > 0.5 and if i uses rule R, the probability with which she 
chooses A in any period t > 1 is strictly greater than qA if she matched in t – 1, and is equal to 
qA otherwise.  Since qA, r  (0, 0), the probability of matching when using rule R is non-zero 
in all periods.  Thus  > 0.5 implies v(R, t) > v(D, t) for all t > 1, completing the proof. 
